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Better Ways to Study Regulatory Elephants
Jonathan B. Wiener, Brendon Swedlow, James K. Hammitt, Michael D. Rogers and Peter H. Sand*
We are grateful to the editor and reviewers for this 
opportunity to respond to the five essays reviewing 
two recent books comparing regulation in the US and 
Europe: The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, 
Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and the 
United States1, and The Reality of Precaution: Compar-
ing Risk Regulation in the United States and Europe2.
We agree with reviewer Maria Weimer3 and with 
David Vogel4 that both of these books help create a 
research agenda for comparative studies of regula-
tion, including studies of relative precaution, by de-
veloping theoretical explanations and a systematic 
basis for collecting data to test them. We also agree 
with reviewer Susan Rose-Ackerman5 that compara-
tive studies of regulation should examine not only 
relative precaution, but more broadly the interrela-
tionships among precaution, proportionality, impact 
assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and other analytic 
frameworks – and the value choices embedded in 
them. We addressed those important issues in the 
concluding chapter of our book6, but they certainly 
deserve additional inquiry. And we thank Fabrizio 
Cafaggi7 for his extensive review of our book in an 
earlier issue of this journal; there he emphasized our 
book’s contribution to the evolving understanding of 
transnational regulatory networks.
Both books undertake a descriptive comparison of 
relative precaution in American and European regu-
lation over the past several decades. The two books 
differ in their findings, and in the evidence on which 
those findings rest. We thank reviewers Susan Rose-
Ackerman8, Adam Burgess9, and Jane K. Winn10 
for acknowledging the strong empirical evidence of 
actual policymaking that is assembled in our book. 
We disagree, however, with the reviewers who allege 
that our book has somehow “missed the wood for the 
trees”11 or cast “empiricism” against “humanism”12, 
ostensibly because Europe yearns to define its “iden-
tity” as precautionary13 or because European regula-
tion “feels” more precautionary14. In our view, it is a 
mistake to confuse rhetoric with reality, or feelings 
with actions, and it is an illusion to conflate political 
aspirations with actual policymaking. That is why we 
studied actual policies: to test whether they reflect 
the political rhetoric or not. To characterize the forest 
and see whether it has moved, one must examine a 
representative sample of the trees – which is what we 
have done. To compare regulatory policies, one must 
actually study the policies and avoid being seduced 
by aspirational rhetoric and symbolic politics which 
are not themselves evidence of real regulation.
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In this reply, we describe areas of agreement be-
tween the two books, and then examine their very 
different findings. In so doing, we respond to the 
reviewers and suggest directions for further research.
Significant areas of agreement between 
the two books
In what is a disappointment to some15 but welcome 
to others16, these two books are mainly descriptive 
– comparative and historical – not mainly norma-
tive; we are not, in these books, primarily evaluating 
which regulations are better, nor whether the pre-
cautionary principle is warranted. Both of our books 
examine the actual regulation of health, safety and 
environmental risks in the US and Europe over the 
last five decades. Both books appear to measure the 
degree of relative precaution as a combination of 
timing (earliness in anticipation of an uncertain or 
emerging risk) and stringency: our book is explicit 
about this approach17, and although Vogel does not 
articulate his measure expressly, he appears to assess 
his cases along the same lines (variously employing 
the terms stringency, risk aversion, and precaution). 
Both find that on several important risks, the degree 
of precaution in US and European policies does dif-
fer.
In addition, both books agree that regulatory sys-
tems are dynamic: they change over time. This may 
seem obvious, but it cuts against prominent popular 
and scholarly assumptions. Both books reject the 
view that risk regulation is determined by fixed cul-
tures of risk, such as the familiar but simplistic ste-
reotypes of Americans as risk-taking technological 
optimists and of Europeans as risk-averse technologi-
cal pessimists (these stereotypes are commonplace 
today and historically, but are often more satirical 
than serious).18 Such a claim of fixed risk cultures is 
at odds with Vogel’s account of US and European reg-
ulation having shifted over time, and with our find-
ing of selective precautions for specific risks adopted 
on each side of the Atlantic. Both of our books also 
find that modern risk regulation is driven by modern 
politics, not predetermined by national “families of 
law”19 or ancient “legal origins”20. This move to a 
dynamic account contrasts with David Vogel’s own 
prior work, in which he had argued that regulatory 
policies conform to distinct “national styles”21; now 
he finds that Europe has switched to adopt much 
of what he had earlier called the American style22. 
Still, he continues to depict American and European 
risk regulation as discrete and coherent blocs that 
evolve as a whole, whereas our book sees them as 
particularized, disaggregated transnational networks 
of diffusion. Finally, both books recognize the value 
of conducting the objective, comprehensive, quantita-
tive analysis23 found in Chapter 15 of Wiener, Rog-
ers, Hammitt et al.24, and we agree that our different 
conclusions are primarily due to differences in our 
case selection methods.
Two very different accounts of relative 
precaution
In The Politics of Precaution25, Vogel makes the claim 
that there has been a “transatlantic shift in regulatory 
stringency since 1990”26, from greater US precaution 
before 1990 to greater European precaution after 
1990. He says that the likelihood of each side’s regu-
lation being “more risk averse” has itself reversed27, 
and in some cases there has been “a literal ‘flip-flop,’ 
with the United States and Europe switching places 
15 E.g. Rose-Ackerman, “Precaution, Proportionality, and Cost/Ben-
efit Analysis”, supra note 5.
16 Weimer, “‘It’s the Politics, Stupid’”, supra note 3.
17 See Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, 
supra note 2, Chapter 20.
18 See Jonathan B. Wiener, “Whose Precaution After All? A Comment 
on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems”, 
13 Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law (2003), 
pp. 207–262; and Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality 
of Precaution, supra note 2, Chapter 1 “The Rhetoric of Precaution”.
19 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Compara-
tive Law, 3rd ed., Trans. Tony Weir (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998).
20 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 
“The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins”, 46 Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature (2008), pp. 435–452.
21 David Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kele-
men”, 7(2) Regulation & Governance (2013), pp. 271–277; Vogel, 
“A More Sophisticated Understanding of the Politics of Precau-
tion”, supra note 4.
22 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1, pp. 289–290.
23 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, 
supra note 21; Vogel, “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the 
Politics of Precaution”, supra note 4.
24 Brendon Swedlow, Denise Kall, Zheng Zhou, James K. Hammitt, 
and Jonathan B. Wiener, “A Quantitative Comparison of Relative 
Precaution in the United States and Europe, 1970–2004”, in Wie-
ner, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra 
note 2, pp. 377–408.
25 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1.
26 Ibid, p. 5.
27 Ibid, p. 2.
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with respect to the adoption of more stringent and 
comprehensive regulations”28. Vogel writes that 
“since around 1990 the American federal regula-
tory policy ‘hare’ has been moving like a ‘tortoise,’ 
while the pace of the European ‘tortoise’ resembles a 
‘hare’”.29 He says this shift has been reflected in and 
enabled by Europe’s adoption of the precautionary 
principle (for example in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty), 
in the face of US criticisms.30 To demonstrate this 
shift to greater European precaution, Vogel examines 
several cases in four detailed chapters. Vogel then 
argues that this transatlantic shift has been driven 
by three main factors on each side of the Atlantic: 
shifting preferences of public opinion, shifting pref-
erences of government leaders, and shifting criteria 
for policy evaluation.
Our research counters Vogel’s claim. In our book, 
The Reality of Precaution31, we studied a large array 
of qualitative case studies, and a quantitative meas-
ure of the relative precaution with which the US 
and Europe regulated 100 representative risks from 
1970–2004. We find no large shift or reversal in 
relative transatlantic regulatory precaution. We find, 
instead, a complex pattern of regulation of multiple 
risks, with general parity between the US and Eu-
rope over the entire period since 1970, punctuated 
by the highly selective application of precaution to 
specific risks on each side – sometimes manifesting 
greater European precaution since 1990, but some-
times greater US precaution since 1990, and no major 
aggregate shift. Among our qualitative case studies 
Europe became more precautionary regarding geneti-
cally modified foods, toxic chemicals, and climate 
change, while the US became more precautionary 
regarding mad cow disease (in beef and in blood), 
fine particle air pollution, tobacco smoking, and ter-
rorism. In our quantitative sample of 100 risks, by 
far the most common pattern (accounting for a third 
of the risks) is that the US and Europe were equally 
precautionary over the past four decades. Patterns 
reflecting a difference but no change in the direction 
of relative precaution were also common, accounting 
for about 20 percent of the risks. These unchanging 
cases are almost evenly divided between the cases in 
which Europe appears to have been more precaution-
ary over the entire period and the cases in which the 
US appears to have been more precautionary over 
the entire period. Of the remaining cases in which 
there was a change in relative precaution, the change 
was slightly more often toward greater relative pre-
caution in Europe, but almost as many cases showed 
the opposite result. Only five percent of the cases in 
our quantitative sample exhibited Vogel’s “flip-flop” 
pattern (see Chapter 15 in Wiener et al. 201132).33
Our causal explanations also differ. Vogel34 at-
tributes his claimed shift in transatlantic precaution 
to changing public preferences, changing leadership 
preferences, and changing criteria for policymaking. 
Yet given our finding of no significant shift, his ex-
planatory factors must be outweighed by other fac-
tors, or must be incorrect.35 For example, Vogel is 
demonstrably wrong that changes in the criteria for 
policymaking could explain the precautionary shift 
he asserts. He argues that US adoption of regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA) using cost-benefit-analysis 
helps explain his claim of reduced relative US pre-
caution since the 1990s (on the premise that RIA 
is a check on precaution). But in reality, no major 
change in US criteria for policymaking occurred 
around 1990: the US adopted RIA at least a decade 
earlier in executive orders issued by Presidents Carter 
and Reagan, and reaffirmed it under President Clin-
ton (whose executive order remains in force today); 
furthermore, the EU adopted RIA starting in 2001 
and has strengthened it since then. These trends in 
policymaking criteria might actually imply the op-
posite of Vogel’s claim – that is, if US adoption of 
RIA before 1990 restrained US precaution before 
1990, and European adoption of RIA after 2001 re-
strained European precaution in recent years. More 
generally, based on our dozen case study chapters 
comparing precaution on specific risks, two chapters 
comparing precaution in risk information systems, 
and four chapters comparing explanatory factors, we 
28 Ibid, p. 5.
29 Ibid, p. 4 (footnotes omitted).
30 Ibid, p. 9.
31 Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, 
supra note 2.
32 Swedlow, Kall, Zhou et al., “A Quantitative Comparison of Rela-
tive Precaution in the United States and Europe, 1970–2004”, su-
pra note 24.
33 See also James K. Hammitt, Jonathan B. Wiener, Brendon Swedlow, 
Denise Kall, and Zheng Zhou, “Precautionary Regulation in Europe 
and in the United States: A Quantitative Comparison”, 25(5) Risk 
Analysis (2005), pp. 1215–1228; Brendon Swedlow, Denise Kall, 
Zheng Zhou, James K. Hammitt, and Jonathan B. Wiener, “Theo-
rizing and Generalizing about Risk Assessment and Regulation 
through Comparative Nested Analysis of Representative Cases”, 
31 Law and Policy (2009), pp. 236–269.
34 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1.
35 For comments on Vogel’s attempts to explain his claimed shift, see 
Jonathan B. Wiener, “The Politics of Precaution, and the Reality” , 
7(2) Regulation & Governance (2013), pp. 258–265.
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find that the causes of the complex pattern are par-
ticular: they derive more from the specific crises and 
public responses, and the particular actors and in-
stitutions involved in each risk and each regulation, 
rather than from wholesale shifts in broad national 
approaches to regulation. And the development of 
RIA in the US followed by the adoption of RIA in 
the EU shows that, rather than two discrete blocs 
moving in opposite directions, the reality in at least 
some important respects is a process of borrowing, 
exchange and diffusion of policy ideas across these 
regulatory systems, yielding interconnectedness and 
hybridization.36
Assessing the two accounts
How can two books on the same subject come to such 
different conclusions? Is there a way to assess and 
compare the validity of these studies? How can we 
build on these studies to come to increasingly valid 
conclusions not only about relative precaution but 
about regulation generally?
Studying Regulatory Elephants
Part of the answer to the first question can be found 
in the parable of the blind men and the elephant. 
This parable inspires empathy for scholars who study 
dynamic regulatory policies across legal systems. 
None of us can see the whole of regulation. This par-
able also explains why the typical approach to these 
studies leads scholars to conclude that regulatory el-
ephants look variously like a snake, tree trunk, fan, 
or wall. When scholars grab handfuls of regulatory 
cases to study, it is not surprising that they frequently 
come to such different conclusions about the nature 
of regulatory elephants. And once scholars think that 
regulatory elephants look like a snake, tree trunk, 
fan, or wall, they continue to grope their way to parts 
of these elephants that feel familiar to them. Regula-
tory elephants are very large and have parts of all 
kinds in sufficient abundance to provide seemingly 
inexhaustible evidence in support of diverse views 
of their nature.
Thus, studies of just the most visible or salient 
risks and regulatory policies are committing the er-
ror of sample selection bias, predictably leading to 
generalizations that mischaracterize the larger reali-
ty. Compounding this initial error, others then accept 
the mischaracterization when it accords with their 
prior positions or with familiar narratives – commit-
ting an error of confirmation bias. A catchy claim 
that confirms prior misimpressions may thereby 
gain favor, despite broader evidence to the contrary; 
meanwhile, studies showing the reality to be more 
complex often fail to gain favor where they do not 
correspond to prior positions or narratives.37 As re-
viewer Winn38 tellingly remarks, Vogel39 seeks to 
“impose a coherent narrative” on debates about pre-
caution –a narrative that may be appealing, but as 
our book shows, is not supported by the evidence 
about actual policies.
These dynamics may explain Burgess’ view40 
that while our book has better evidence, he is still 
“inclined to side with Vogel’s approach” because Vo-
gel’s claim better matches Burgess’ feelings about the 
“character” of European precaution. He emphasizes 
that precaution is often “symbolic” politics about 
“identity,” rather than concrete policy, a point on 
which we agree, and which could be the subject of a 
different study building on our work, as we suggest 
below. For the moment, it is important to empha-
size, as we do in our book, that the “character” or 
“identity” of “symbolic politics” is not the same as 
actual policymaking. That is why we studied actual 
policies. That we found no significant shift to greater 
European precaution in actual policies is not belied 
by European political rhetoric favoring precaution; 
rather, it shows the disjunction between rhetoric and 
reality. Despite the rhetoric, the evidence indicates 
that real policies are moderated in practice, and real 
societies are selective in their application of precau-
tion. We found important examples of greater US 
precaution, with their own political rhetoric about 
national identity (e.g. on terrorism).
Similarly, Winn41 finds Vogel’s flip-flop story 
more congenial to her “feeling” than the more com-
36 See Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, 
supra note 2, chapter 20; Jonathan B. Wiener, “The Diffusion of 
Regulatory Oversight”, in Michael A. Livermore and Richard L. 
Revesz (eds), The Globalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environ-
mental Policy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
pp. 123–141.
37 For other examples of this pathology of catchy but faulty generali-
zations in research and public discourse, see Wiener, Rogers, Ham-
mitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, chapter 1.
38 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.
39 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1.
40 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.
41 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.
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plex depiction of the precautionary reality offered in 
our book, but concedes that her own view is “impres-
sionistic” and “lacks … rigor.” She suggests that we 
protest too much, because she thinks Vogel never 
claimed that Europe has become more precautionary 
since 1990, yet Vogel42 makes just this claim, which 
we have reproduced above and which we also quote 
in our book. She fears that our book’s “empiricism” 
is at odds with what she calls “humanism” (though 
she simply labels Vogel’s historical account with 
that term, with no explanation of what it means or 
why one history is “humanist” and another is not). 
She complains that we cite too many references. We 
agree with Winn that our book is carefully empiri-
cal, which we see as a strength. We do not agree 
that our book is somehow at odds with humanism or 
history – our book is clearly just as much (as Vogel’s) 
about the history of human choices, ideas, percep-
tions, and consequences; and our book says as much 
or more about the history of precaution in culture, art 
and literature than do other assessments of compara-
tive regulation (we discuss, among others, Homer, 
Montaigne, Goethe, de Beaumarchais, Cooper, Wil-
de, Blake, La Rochefoucauld, Berlin, Delacroix, and 
Bruegel). Winn43 advocates reliance on “schemes” to 
make sense of the world; we do not deny the value of 
such mental models, but our point is that when they 
are based on a misreading of reality, they need to be 
revised and updated. She bases her own “scheme” 
of greater European precaution on her “personal ex-
periences” living in Europe and on her study of “the 
Internet and electronic commerce.” While our book 
is a collaboration of both European and American 
authors, and many of our contributors have lived in 
both places, we specifically discuss how personal ex-
periences and focusing on one case can be mislead-
ing about the larger reality.
Both Burgess44 and Durodié45 assert that our 
book “misses the wood for the trees.” But they are 
assuming that they know the forest and its move-
ment. Our book shows that upon closer examination, 
the forest has not shifted; in reality, only a few trees 
have shifted in one direction, while other trees have 
shifted in the other direction, and most trees have 
stayed put. Marking a trail on just a few nearby trees, 
or grabbing a nearby handful of elephant, does not 
accurately characterize the larger reality. Claims of 
a wholesale shift in relative transatlantic precaution 
cannot be based on generalizations drawn from just 
a few salient examples.
Social science standards for assessing the 
validity of the two accounts
Evaluating two different detailed comparative and 
historical accounts requires more than resort to feel-
ings or intuitions; it requires criteria for assessing 
social science. Standards of internal and external 
validity are helpful to social scientists in evaluating 
research. A study has internal validity if its findings 
are internally consistent, address confounding vari-
ables and the temporal sequence of cause and effect, 
and thus are credible for the case being studied. A 
study has external validity if its findings can be used 
to generalize to a broader class of cases.46 Here we 
will briefly assess internal validity and more exten-
sively assess external validity, because differences 
in the external validity of the cases studied are the 
primary reason for the different conclusions of these 
two books.
Assessing the validity of the books’ qualitative 
case study chapters
Books based on case studies typically have high inter-
nal validity and low external validity because the cas-
es in these books usually are well executed but are se-
lected in ways that prevent their findings from being 
generalized beyond the cases studied. The case study 
chapters in both of the two books reviewed here fit 
this general pattern in social science, because they 
42 David Vogel, “Ships Passing in the Night: The Changing Politics of 
Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States”, Working Paper 
2001/16, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European 
University Institute, available on the Internet at <http://www.eui.
eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/01_16.pdf> (last accessed on 18 April 2013); 
David Vogel, “The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Poli-
tics of Consumer and Environmental Regulation in Europe”, 33 
British Journal of Political Science (2003), pp. 557–580; Vogel, The 
Politics of Precaution, supra note 1.
43 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.
44 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.
45 Durodié, “Precautionary Tales”, supra note 11.
46 See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing So-
cial Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) on drawing inferences from 
case studies. For application of these standards to studies of regu-
lation see Allan Mazur, True Warnings and False Alarms: Evaluating 
Fears about the Health Risks of Technology, 1948–1971 (Washing-
ton, DC: Resources for the Future, 2004) and Brendon Swedlow, 
“Review of Allan Mazur’s ‘True Warnings and False Alarms: Evalu-
ating Fears about the Health Risks of Technology, 1948–1971”, 8(4) 
Environmental Science and Policy (2005), pp. 236–269.
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are high quality, successful efforts to determine the 
relative regulatory precaution of the US and Europe 
in the cases studied, but these cases cannot be used 
to generalize about relative precaution. Neither set of 
case study chapters is representative of the larger uni-
verse of risk policies. But the fact that our larger ar-
ray of case studies found diverse degrees of selective 
precaution in US and European risk regulation, with 
some cases of greater European precaution and some 
cases of greater US precaution, undermines Vogel’s 
claim of a wholesale shift toward greater European 
precaution based on his set of case studies (though 
does not by itself prove a contrary trend).
Significant evidence for the high internal valid-
ity of the case study chapters in both books is pro-
vided by the fact that the books generally come to 
the same conclusions where they studied the same 
cases. Both books find greater European precaution 
since 1990 on beef hormones, genetically modified 
foods, climate change, and chemicals; and conver-
gence on new drug approval. The books differ in 
their assessment of one case. In contrast to Vogel, 
we find that on mad cow disease (bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy, BSE), regulatory policies were more 
precautionary since 1990 in the US than in Europe 
– both as to imports of British beef, and especially 
regarding the risk of transmitting the human form, 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (vCJD), via blood 
donations. The highly stringent US FDA blood dona-
tion policy, officially titled “precautionary,” was not 
discussed in Vogel’s book (because, he says, it was 
not a “business-caused” risk and therefore was out-
side the “scope” of his study47 – even though hospi-
tals and blood banks are businesses).
The low external validity of case study chapters 
hampers or negates Vogel’s attempt to generalize 
about the broad categories of risk represented by his 
chapter headings: food safety and agriculture, air pol-
lution, chemicals and hazardous substances, and con-
sumer safety. Each of these chapters contains some 
risk case studies that exhibit Vogel’s claimed flip-flop 
pattern, but because Vogel selected these cases with-
out determining how representative they are of the 
larger category, they have low external validity with 
respect to generalizing about the category. The cases 
within Vogel’s chapters are likely to be as unrepre-
sentative of precautionary patterns in the chapter cat-
egory as they are of US and European precautionary 
regulation in general. For example, when we exam-
ined the Food Safety and Agriculture category in our 
data set (described in the next paragraph), we found 
that the category included seven different precaution-
ary patterns, only one of which was Vogel’s flip-flop 
pattern. Meanwhile, other studies find wide varia-
tion in relative precaution within Europe48, further 
undermining claims of a European trend.
Assessing the validity of our quantitative study 
of relative precaution
Recognizing these challenges to the external validity 
of case study chapters, we endeavored to improve 
on the methodology of comparative regulatory stud-
ies. Our book includes an additional study for which 
cases were selected in a way to support valid gener-
alizations. We identified a universe of 2,878 environ-
mental, health, and safety risks from the literature on 
risks in the US and Europe over the period, and then 
drew a random sample of 100 of them to study.49 
This sample allowed us to generalize to the universe 
of risk policies, and gives our study its claim to high 
external validity.
In our sample of 100 risks, we found no signifi-
cant trend toward increased European relative pre-
caution after 1990. The net trend we observed is of 
the same magnitude as if only about 5% of the risk 
regulations shifted from more precautionary in the 
US to more precautionary in Europe, and 95% did 
not shift. And among the risks in our sample, we 
observed 12 patterns of relative precaution. The most 
common pattern was that the US and Europe regu-
lated with equal precaution; one of the least com-
mon patterns was Vogel’s “flip-flop” pattern. These 
findings corroborate the varied patterns of relative 
precaution found in our case study chapters, and sug-
gest that the flip-flop pattern of Vogel’s case study 
chapters is true of only a very small percentage (5%) 
of the larger universe of cases. (Winn50 suggests that 
we employed “meta-analysis,” but that is not what 
47 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, 
supra note 21.
48 Peter H. Sand, “The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspec-
tive”, 6 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment (2000), pp. 445–
458; Joakim Zander, The Application of the Precautionary Princi-
ple in Practice: Comparative Dimensions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).
49 See Swedlow, Kall, Zhou et al., “Theorizing and Generalizing about 
Risk Assessment and Regulation through Comparative Nested Anal-
ysis of Representative Cases”, supra note 33; Wiener, Rogers, Ham-
mitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, supra note 2, chapter 15. 
50 Winn, “Precautionary Schemes”, supra note 10.
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we did; a meta-analysis is an aggregate study of data 
from several prior studies, but we collected our own 
data and performed our own analysis.)
We expressly recognize (here and in our book) 
that this quantitative methodology has some limita-
tions compared to qualitative case studies. That is 
why we used both methods, rather than just one or 
the other. For example, although we scored our sam-
ple of 100 for relative precaution in official regulatory 
standards, we were not able to deepen this analysis to 
study political context, degree of actual implementa-
tion, policy impacts, or other attributes (which we did 
explore in our case study chapters and cross-cutting 
chapters). Still, the advantage of the large-N quanti-
tative sampling approach is that it has much higher 
external validity than do qualitative case studies: be-
cause the sample is an unbiased representation of the 
broader universe, it can support characterizations of 
general trends – which an unrepresentative selection 
of case studies cannot. Reviewer Maria Weimer51 
commends our approach. Again, that is why we un-
dertook both methods – qualitative and quantitative 
– because each offers advantages in understanding 
regulation.
Vogel52 argues that the main difference between 
our books is that they examine different sets of cases. 
This is surprising because both books repeatedly say, 
including in the title of Vogel’s book, that they are 
studying precautionary regulation of environmental, 
health, and safety risks in the US and Europe. In 
his introduction, however, Vogel says that his “fo-
cus is on a subset of risks, namely those that involve 
health, safety, and environmental risks caused by 
business”.53 Subsequently he narrows his focus even 
further: “I confine my study to regulations that ad-
dress consumer and environmental risks, primarily 
to public health and safety, and which are caused 
largely by the decisions of business firms”.54 Thus 
he appears to exclude most cases of environmental 
risk that do not also pose public health and safety 
risks. And he excludes public health and safety risks 
that are not largely “caused by business.” Moreover, 
he claims that he is only interested in studying the 
regulation of important risks of these kinds, where 
importance is “measured by their costs, political sa-
lience, or the magnitude of the harms they are at-
tempting to avoid or ameliorate”.55 Thus, he claims 
that it is among the subset of important, business-
caused health and safety risks that the flip-flop pat-
tern of precaution dominates.
As Wiener discusses further elsewhere56, Vogel’s 
scope limitation to “caused by business” appears ar-
bitrary, excluding many important risks that happen 
to exhibit greater US precaution (for example, Vo-
gel says it does not include terrorism, or mad cow 
disease in blood); is difficult to implement, because 
many risks are caused by combinations of business 
and other factors and cannot be distinguished as 
simply caused or not caused by business; and even 
if applied, would actually include risks that Vogel 
supposes it excludes (such as mad cow disease in 
blood, where causal factors include businesses in 
farming, animal feed, food processing, blood banks, 
and hospitals). Nevertheless, even though Vogel has 
either not given reasons or has offered what in our 
view are inadequate reasons for limiting the scope of 
his study to important, business-caused health and 
safety risks, we have made a preliminary attempt to 
study this subset of risks within our universe of risks, 
as discussed below. Our finding from this prelimi-
nary re-analysis is that the flip-flop pattern remains 
a minor pattern even within Vogel’s subset of risks.
It is important to emphasize that Vogel has not 
studied a representative sample of even the subset 
he claims to characterize. Had Vogel constructed a 
universe of his subset, and randomly selected cases 
from it to study, he would have the same claim to 
external validity as we do. But he did not do this. 
What he did instead is gather some cases of a par-
ticular kind – i.e., important, business-caused health 
and safety risks that he found salient – without any 
way to know how representative these cases are of 
others of this kind that he did not study. While this 
may be a standard way to assemble books of cases 
in regulatory studies, there is no way around the fact 
that cases selected in this manner have low or no 
external validity. As discussed above, this point holds 
as well for each of the four major categories of cases 
represented by Vogel’s four case study chapters: there 
is no way to know if the various cases studied within 
51 Weimer, “‘It’s the Politics, Stupid’”, supra note 3. 
52 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, 
supra note 21; Vogel, “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the 
Politics of Precaution”, supra note 4.
53 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1, on p. 18.
54 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, 
supra note 21.
55 Ibid; see also Vogel, The Politics of Precaution, supra note 1, p. 4.
56 Wiener, “The Politics of Precaution, and the Reality”, supra note 35.
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these chapters are representative of the chapter cat-
egory. This basic point holds as well for Vogel’s chap-
ter categories: there is no way to know how repre-
sentative these categories are of other categories, nor 
how many other categories there are. Our study, by 
contrast, took a random, representative sample from 
our best effort to collect the universe of 2,878 risks, 
inductively subdivided the universe and our sample 
into 18 categories and 92 subcategories of risks, and 
found great diversity of regulatory patterns within as 
well as across these categories.
Our preliminary study of the subset of “impor-
tant, business-caused health and safety risks” (Vogel’s 
scope) in our own random sample of 100 shows that 
Vogel’s flip-flop pattern is only a minor pattern of 
transatlantic precaution even within that subset. First, 
95 of our 100 risks involve threats to health or safety 
or both; 45 involve threats to health, safety, and the 
environment; and only two involve threats solely to 
the environment.57 Based on a preliminary attempt 
to code our 100 risks, at least 80 of them are caused 
by business, either directly or indirectly, and these 80 
cases all fall within the 95 health and/or safety risks 
in our sample. Meanwhile, the five flip-flop cases in 
our sample all fall within these 80 business-caused 
cases, making them six percent of this subset of cases 
(rather than five percent of the 100 cases). Thus, focus-
ing on the business-caused subset of health and safety 
risks in our sample barely increases the very small 
proportion of cases that exhibit the flip-flop pattern.
Vogel58, along with Burgess59, conjectures that if 
our sample were weighted for the “importance” of 
each risk, it would show a greater shift to relative 
European precaution since 1990. They offer no evi-
dence for this conjecture. Our qualitative case studies 
indicate the opposite: arguably the most “important” 
risks in both books (measured by the magnitude of 
health and safety burden in mortality and morbidity) 
are tobacco and fine particle air pollution, both of 
which exhibit greater US precaution since 1990 (as 
does another potentially highly important emerging 
risk, terrorism; yet climate change points the other 
way). In our quantitative sample, the 5 or 6% of risks 
trending toward European precaution would have to 
be many times more “important” than the other 94 
or 95% of risks not trending toward greater European 
precaution, for the net trend to just barely validate 
Vogel’s conjecture; this is highly implausible. We are 
therefore confident that neither the qualitative case 
studies nor the quantitative data analysis support 
Vogel’s conjecture.
Contributions to the study of relative 
precaution and regulation
Both books significantly advance the study of rela-
tive precaution and of regulation more generally. 
The case studies of both books advance regulatory 
studies by developing and testing explanations for 
the patterns found in these cases. They thus provide 
more robust tests of various explanations than stud-
ies that test their explanations against fewer cases. 
As a result of these tests, the books are able to rule 
out some explanations. Thus, Vogel and we agree 
that static conceptions of national political culture60
, or families of law or legal origins61, cannot account 
for the dynamic precautionary patterns we have ob-
served. Vogel also rules out a variety of other expla-
nations for the flip-flop pattern. Vogel argues that 
three factors explain his claimed shift: changing pub-
lic preferences, changing leadership preferences, and 
changing criteria for policy (see discussion above). 
Critiques of Vogel’s explanations62, however, have 
led Vogel to add the additional explanatory factor 
of party system differences63. Further research will 
be necessary to determine whether these factors are 
sufficient to explain the very large percentage of risks 
that do not exhibit the flip-flop pattern. Because the 
data do not indicate a significant shift toward greater 
European relative precaution, Vogel’s factors explain-
ing such a shift must have been outweighed by other 
factors – notably, factors that instead drive what we 
find, namely a more complex pattern of issue-specific 
policy choice and selective precaution on both sides 
of the Atlantic.
57 See Table 15.2 in Swedlow, Kall, Zhou et al., “A Quantitative Com-
parison of Relative Precaution in the United States and Europe, 
1970–2004”, supra note 24.
58 Vogel , “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the Politics of Pre-
caution”, supra note 4.
59 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.
60 David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy 
in Great Britain and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1986).
61 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, supra 
note 19; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, “The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins”, supra note 20.
62 R. Daniel Kelemen, “Commentary on Vogel’s The Politics of Pre-
caution” 7(2) Regulation & Governance (2013), pp. 266–270; Wie-
ner, “The Politics of Precaution, and the Reality”, supra note 35.
63 Vogel, “Response to Jonathan B. Wiener and R. Daniel Kelemen”, 
supra note 21.
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Our book also advances the methodology of reg-
ulatory studies by constructing a universe of envi-
ronmental, health, and safety risks and by using a 
representative sample of that universe to provide a 
quantitative account of the relative regulatory precau-
tion of the US and Europe with a plausible claim to 
external validity. Reviewer Weimer64 highlights the 
methodological advance offered by this approach. 
This universe and sample represent significant re-
sources for regulatory scholars. One of us is building 
a collaborative research network to collect additional 
information on these cases to answer a variety of 
questions and test a variety of regulatory theories.65 
To accelerate data collection and theory testing, we 
and collaborators are studying a smaller representa-
tive sample of 30 risks, using a mixed-method ap-
proach called comparative nested analysis.66 This 
additional research can be used to test alternative 
explanations for relative precaution, as well as a va-
riety of other explanations for other regulatory phe-
nomena, an enterprise we are pleased to learn that 
Vogel67 also endorses.
Our risk universe, sample, and methods could be 
used, for example, to answer some questions posed 
by three of our reviewers. Rose-Ackerman68 would 
have liked both books to investigate and compare 
the US and Europe with respect to their use of dif-
ferent approaches to precaution and to study how the 
proportionality principle, cost-benefit analysis, and 
regulatory impact assessment relate to precautionary 
regulation in these polities. Our book begins to do 
so in its concluding chapter69, in which we report on 
the growing use of these approaches in the European 
as well as in US regulation. She is also interested in 
better understanding which values are embedded in 
choices among risk analytic techniques and how val-
ues are otherwise brought to bear in risk assessment 
and regulation. These worthwhile objectives could 
be investigated in our sample of cases in the ongo-
ing collaborative study just mentioned. Similarly, 
further study of these cases would help furnish bet-
ter answers to Burgess’70 questions about how risk 
regulation is connected to historical trends and dis-
continuities in politics, and how precautionary regu-
lation relates to what he sees as a crisis of identity in 
Europe. Likewise, Durodié’s71 desire to understand 
the extent to which and reasons why transatlantic 
political elites perceived that a precautionary flip-
flop was underway could be aided by studying our 
representative sample of cases. In other words, there 
are many opportunities here to study regulatory el-
ephants in better ways.
64 Weimer, “‘It’s the Politics, Stupid’”, supra note 3.
65 Swedlow, Kall, Zhou et al, “Theorizing and Generalizing about Risk 
Assessment and Regulation through Comparative Nested Analysis 
of Representative Cases”, supra note 33. 
66 Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy 
for Comparative Research”, 99 American Political Science Review 
(2005), pp. 435–452.
67 Vogel, “A More Sophisticated Understanding of the Politics of Pre-
caution”, supra note 4.
68 Rose-Ackerman, “Precaution, Proportionality, and Cost/Benefit 
Analysis: False Analogies”, supra note 5.
69 Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt and Sand, The Reality of Precaution, su-
pra note 2, chapter 20.
70 Burgess, “Missing the Wood for the Trees”, supra note 9.
71 Durodié, “Precautionary Tales”, supra note 11.
